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Alternate Title: What will it take for the next major technology company to develop in Boston? Or, anywhere else for that matter?

Facebook recently released their much anticipated initial S-1 IPO filing.[1] It’s been all over the trade and national news along with other recent and forthcoming IPOs.

The general expectation is that Facebook will be valued at $80-100 billion. At that valuation, Facebook will create 10s of billionaires and approaching a 1000 millionaires.[2,3] The created wealth will have a lasting effect on the technology sector and future landscape as Facebook millionaires begin investing in new technologies and entrepreneurs.[4] Also, the resulting capital gains and income from stock and options will generate a lot of tax revenue for California and the U.S.[5]

Boston has not built any major technology companies, on the scale of Google or Facebook, in past 20 years.[6]

The Facebook IPO again raises the question: What would it take, what needs to change in order to build the next major technology company in the Boston area? [7] And the corollary questions: Are stakeholders actually willing to do what it takes? Or, will inertia and myopic irrationality continue to erode Boston’s potential regional advantage in the technology sector.

Here, we’ll look at some of the specific conditions that were primary enablers for Facebook and other major technology companies, and how they relate to Boston. The listed order of the conditions tends to be consistent with Facebook’s chronology, but otherwise, the order or length of discussion is not meant to indicate any particular meaning.

1. The next Facebook won’t be like Facebook.

Searching the dorms of Harvard (or another university) for the next Mark Zuckerberg completely misses the point. The next Facebook won’t look like Facebook, it will go against whatever is current conventional wisdom.

At the time (c. 2004), conventional wisdom doubted that social networking could expand beyond a fad on a few university campuses, and doubted whether it could be monetized beyond being a hobby.

Facebook was actually pitched first in Boston. For an investigative look at how Boston VCs passed on Facebook, see [8]. Not much has changed since then, so that it is hard to see why Boston wouldn’t pass on the next Facebook.

Also at the time, the investment industry was still trying to recover from the dotcom bust, and many were reluctant to invest in ventures (a) that were based on a “get big fast, figure out the revenue later” business model, or (b) whose business models were based primarily on advertising.[9]

The key observation here is that “conventional wisdom” was wrong.[10] Facebook, Google, Apple, etc., all went against their era of conventional wisdom. The next major technology company will go against its context of conventional wisdom as well.

“Doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results is stupid.” ~ Aphorism [11]

2. Serendipity matters a lot.[12]

Facebook was not the first social network. At the time (c. 2004), many thought it wasn’t particularly better than or distinctly different from other social networks like Friendster (started c. 2002 [13]) or MySpace (started c. 2003 [14]) or even earlier social platforms. For a snapshot of the history of social networks c. 2007, see [15].

The various social networking efforts were known to each other. MySpace was billed as a next-generation Friendster. As MySpace became edgier, perhaps too racy, and plagued with spam, Facebook was thought to be a “safer” alternative.

In retrospect, MySpace’s biggest obstacle is typically attributed to News Corp.’s attempts to prematurely make MySpace a profit center. Friendster’s biggest obstacle is typically attributed its unstable platform or uncertain strategy. Certainly, those are valid criticisms. However, events could have just as easily gone the other way. What in retrospect is an obstacle, at the time, might have been turned into opportunity. News Corp. provided MySpace with very strong media industry access. Friendster had many notable Silicon Valley advisers, investors, and board members.

Facebook was able to learn a lot from looking at the missteps of others, but serendipity appears to have been as important as hard work.

“Chance favors the prepared mind.” ~ Louis Pasteur [16]

3. Technological and market inevitability.

Along with serendipity, a high degree of inevitability is necessary.

As the Internet began to scale, and more and more people began spending more and more time on the Internet, it was inevitable that one or more entities would provide one or more social networking platforms. The precise form of the platforms would remain uncertain until it became obvious.

Social networking, as currently defined, would not have made much sense during the early days of the Internet. There was not enough technology, not enough scale, and not enough diversity. However, in the context of the early Internet, there was a lot of discussion, research, and small scale developments of the kinds of social environments that eventually would be enabled by the Internet (for a very early view, see Licklider 1968 [17]). It was inevitable that social networking would exist, but a few other technologies needed to be invented and built, and access to the Internet needed to become more pervasive and ubiquitous.

PCs, the Internet, graphical user interfaces, digital media, smart phones, etc. — each were seen as inevitable by some people long before a market was defined and created. Each of these developments also had many detractors, some of whom were hostile or obstructive.

“We stand on the shoulders of giants.” ~ Isaac Newton

4. Founder control matters a lot too.

Zuckerberg has maintained dominant control over Facebook’s direction since its beginnings. He had important advisers, but the final say was his. Whether or not you agree with the details of the path that Zuckerberg took Facebook, and apparently, many insiders did disagree with the details, it is hard to dispute Facebook’s current success.

The Facebook S-1 outlines the degree of control that Mark Zuckerberg has and will continue to have over the governance of Facebook.[1] News reports discuss this in more detail.[18] Zuckerberg directly holds 28.2% of the shares, and has voting proxy for another 30.6% of shares; thus, he controls 56.9% of the vote. Almost all of these are Class B shares which yield 10 votes per share compared to 1 vote per share for the Class A shares that will issue with the IPO. Further, when current holders sell their Class B shares, the sold shares convert to Class A, which would further consolidate Zuckerberg’s control.

Though this degree of founder control may seem off scale, it is not when compared to other major successful technology companies. Bill Gates held 49% of Microsoft at its IPO in 1986, and Sergey Brin and Larry Page together held 32% of Google at its IPO in 2004.[18]

This then brings to question whether Facebook could have achieved even a fraction of its current success if investors had taken their usual early control of the company. You can just imagine how Zuckerberg would have been repeatedly chided and overridden by those in “control” who were convinced they “knew better” (c.f., Steve Jobs ouster from Apple, c. 1985). Reportedly, Zuckerberg always had a definite idea of how Facebook should evolve, though he may not have always been very good at communicating a strategy to the satisfaction of others. Nonetheless, his control of the company likely prevented Facebook from suffering a fate similar to Friendster or MySpace.

“If one does not know to which port one is sailing, no wind is favorable.” – Seneca

5. Founder as CEO.

Founder as CEO is another type of control that is more operational than the control provided by the above voting rights. It directly effects company strategy and direction, decision making, as well as governance.

Because Zuckerberg always maintained the CEO position, he was able to drive company strategy and decision making directly without having to explain to someone else what decisions to make and why. The founder as CEO is much more effective operationally than an outsider CEO. To augment any skills or experience that the founder CEO may lack, someone with that experience can always be hired to support the founder CEO.

Quoting a recent article on this topic [19]:

“This year, dozens of startup company founders will be forced out and replaced by experienced outsider CEOs, often from public companies, brought in by venture capital investors to provide “adult supervision.” You can bet that none of these companies will become the next Hewlett-Packard, the original Silicon Valley technology company – or the next Intel, Microsoft, Oracle, or Apple.* These technology juggernauts span software, hardware, services, and media, but they all have something in common. Their founders served as transformative chief executives.

“Still, the conventional wisdom among investors, if not the media, is that founders need to move out of the way for an experienced CEO to take a company ‘to the next level’. …

“Outsider, non-founder CEOs are often overvalued because many corporate boards think the answer to their problems is a superstar CEO with an outsized reputation. This leads them to overpay for people who are good at creating outsized reputations through networking, interviewing, and taking credit for other peoples’ achievements–all bad indicators of future success. …

“Founders tend to know their companies better than outsiders. They know their industries better than most outsiders. They are often more motivated than the average hired-gun CEO to improve a company’s long-term prospects. They are more likely to be innovators, having taken the step of founding a company. In tech firms, they usually know technology better than a typical outsider CEO, whose specialty skews toward marketing and networking.”

And with respect to Google, the article notes:

“Google, arguably, did succeed with adult supervision in the person of Eric Schmidt, CEO from 2001 to 2011. But note that the two founders remained in top positions (outsiders referred to the three as “co-CEOs”) and Schmidt was succeeded by one of the founders.”

Further note that Eric Schmidt was a technologist and worked well with Sergey Brin and Larry Page. Schmidt was not as much of an outsider.

Another key question: Is an outsider CEO’s interests aligned with the founders or with the investors? Founder alignment (c.f., Schmidt) portends greater success than investor alignment. Unfortunately, outsider CEOs tend more naturally to align themselves with investors to the detriment of founders and notably to the detriment of the success of the company.

“The chief strategist of an organization has to be the leader – the CEO.” Michael Porter

6. A trusted adviser who gets “it” and amplifies “it”.

Sometimes the early trusted adviser is also the first investor. Sometimes he or she is a mentor. Sometimes, a co-founder or business partner or perhaps a relative. There needs to be someone with whom the founder can openly, speculatively, safely, and efficiently bounce around ideas.

From accounts, it is clear that Zuckerberg getting together with Sean Parker was very important, and came at a critical time for the company. It was serendipitous. Parker provided a significant amplification for Facebook’s strategy. “Back then Parker apparently believed even more passionately in the company’s potential than did Zuckerberg himself.” Parker became Facebook’s president. However, Parker came with notable liabilities. See the references [20] for more of the history.

In some respects, Parker was like a more experienced Zuckerberg with some successes and some failures.

Would Facebook have been as successful if Zuckerberg had not met Parker? Some adviser was probably needed at that time. Would a less controversial person have been able to provide the needed amplification for Zuckerberg and Facebook?

(For a few related interesting startup stories of other major technology companies, see here.)

“Getting it is much more than just saying the words ‘I get it’.” – Anonymous

7. Access to the first (angel) investor.

The first investor of an ultimately successful major technology company, like Facebook, is often important for reasons that go beyond just the money brought to the venture. The investment needs to be substantial enough to achieve a major milestone for the company, then it is helpful if the investor brings more to the effort than just money.

As has been noted in recent years, the initial critical investment often comes not from venture capital but from an angel investor, investing his/her own money. The angel investor typically made money as a recently successful entrepreneur within the prior 10 year innovation cycle. Because of his/her recent success, the angel investor is motivated to support the next generation of innovation and entrepreneurs.[21]

In 1977, Mike Markkula, having participated in Intel’s success, invested $250K with Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak to fund development of the Apple II. Markkula then became Apple’s third founder.[22]

In 1999, Andy Bechtolsheim, one of Sun Microsystems’ founders, invested $100K with Sergey Brin and Larry Page to form Google, even though at the time, there already were many search engines, and many people questioned whether another search engine was really needed.[23]

Everyone that’s been paying attention (or saw the movie) knows that Peter Thiel, a founder of PayPal, was first to invest in Facebook, investing $500K. Thiel invested even though Facebook was being threatened with litigation, and even though Thiel had invested in other social networks.

Angel investors often have their own reasons for investing that typically is more than just making money.

(a) Thiel said, “You always hope for strong returns, but the companies that make you proud as an investor are the ones that produce that return by transforming the world for the better—technologically, socially, and economically.”[24]

(b) Guy Kawasaki, an early employee of Apple, said, “Here’s how angel investors differ from venture capitalists. Typically, angel investors have a triple bottom line. First, they’ve “made it,” so now they want to “pay back” society by helping the next generation of entrepreneurs. Second, they’d like to stay current with technology and tinker with interesting products and technologies. Finally, they want to make money. Thus, they are often willing to invest in less proven, more risky deals to provide entrepreneurs with the ability to get to the next stage. I know many nice venture capitalists, but I cannot tell you that many of them are motivated by the desire to pay back society or seek intellectual stimulation. :-)” [25]

In the past 20 years, Boston has not built any major technology companies on the scale of Google or Facebook, which in turn has not produced a large number financially successful employees of these companies looking to be angel investors. Thus, though there are angel investors in Boston, they are fewer in number, they invest with a much smaller pool of personal funds, and many built their companies and successes more than 20 years ago or in businesses which aren’t the basis of current innovations (c.f., Web 2.0 Internet).[26]

8. A broad pool of potential employees with relevant skills.

To build beyond the initial team of founders and employees and scale the company, there needs to be a broad pool of available potential employees who have the skills and experience that are relevant to growing the company’s products and services. Importantly, it needs to be straightforward to hire these new employees with few obstructions in the hiring process.

Perhaps the greatest obstruction to the hiring process is the use of non-compete agreements. Non-competes are especially problematic when they overreach or simply are used to provide an overall chilling effect to employee mobility.

Facebook hired many of its employees from Google and other area technology companies. Because non-compete agreements are not valid in California, Google employees were free to move to Facebook without untoward obstacles. Google could make counteroffers to convince employees not to go to Facebook, but it could not pretend that there may be some illusory competition between search and social networks, and it could not threaten employees and their potential employers with costly litigation.

Google similarly benefited during its early growth period when it was able to hire unimpeded from other companies. Google continued to thrive even though several of its employees moved to Facebook.

The ability to hire to scale each company during its respective critical growth period was extremely important to each company’s success. That ability to hire was a result of the region’s employee mobility due to the lack of employee non-compete agreements.[27]

Because of the Boston area’s use of non-compete agreements and the resulting limits to employee mobility, Google and Facebook could not have been built in the Boston area.

Non-competes hinder innovation in two ways. (1) The non-compete is a direct obstacle for an employee moving from one employer to a different employer. This is true even if there is no actual competition between the former and future employer. (2) Perhaps more importantly, an employee who is constrained from moving to a new position often tends to work within his/her current narrow job description. The employee often does not experience new or alternate work environments; thus, may never gain the experiences that would be valuable to a new growing company.

“Practically every enterprise [is] threatened and put on the defensive as soon as it comes into existence.” – Schrumpeter [28]

9. Ability to attract a few experienced executive employees.

Even though founder control is important, a growing company still needs to hire experienced senior management to support and augment the founder.

Sheryl Sandberg was an important addition to Facebook as COO in 2008. Her skills and experience complemented Zuckerberg without replacing him or lessening his role. Importantly, Zuckerberg as CEO still gets to make the final call. Zuckerberg and Sandberg formed a partnership for joint decision making and running the company, somewhat similar to Google’s earlier triumvirate of Sergey Brin, Larry Page, and Eric Schmidt. For more background on Sheryl Sandberg, see [29]

Sandberg joined Facebook from Google in 2008 after spending 7 years at Google as Vice President of Global Online Sales & Operations. During those 7 years, Google grew its annual revenue geometrically from ~$86M to ~$20B. When she joined Facebook, it had ~$150M annual revenue; it now has $3.7B annual revenue and growing.

Many other executives and senior managers came to Facebook with experience from other major technology companies in addition to Google, including, LinkedIn, Yahoo, Mozilla, Friendfeed, Ebay, MySpace, Amazon, etc. Note that most of the companies were founded within the past 20 years. Also note that most of the companies are local to Facebook.

The absence of non-compete agreements also figures prominently in hiring key executives as well.

“Hire people who are better than you are, then leave them to get on with it. Look for people who will aim for the remarkable, who will not settle for the routine.” – David Ogilvy

“If each of us hires people who are smaller than we are, we shall become a company of dwarfs. But if each of us hires people who are bigger than we are, we shall become a company of giants.” – David Ogilvy [30]

Next Steps.

The primary enablers discussed above are not necessarily the only conditions that factor into developing a major technology company. For example, sometimes access to capital or co-location with customers or partners can be important as well; but now, capital is fairly mobile, and location is more globally oriented. Thus, the above enablers can carry more weight in determining the ability to develop the next major technology company.

Of the above enablers:

    1. The next Facebook won’t be like Facebook.
    2. Serendipity matters a lot.
    3. Technological and market inevitability.
    4. Founder control matters a lot too.
    5. Founder as CEO.
    6. A trusted adviser who gets “it” and amplifies “it”.
    7. Access to the first (angel) investor.
    8. A broad pool of potential employees with relevant skills.
    9. Ability to attract a few experienced executive employees.

Items 1,4,5 simply run counter to “the way things are done” traditionally in the Boston technology culture. The ideas and companies that get funded are not like the next Facebook; control is generally taken away from founders; and, an outsider CEO often installed. Since these traditional behaviors obviously have not been working, you’d think that the behavior would change.

Silicon Valley’s culture has its own conventions, and in some respects, may not be that different from Boston’s, but there are plenty of examples of companies not getting funding in Boston that do get funding when they move to Silicon Valley.

Items 7,8,9 expose the significant regional disadvantage for Boston that derives from not having any major technology companies on the scale of Google or Facebook developed in Boston in the past 20 years. There are no angel investors on the scale of employees from PayPal, Google, or Facebook to fund the ideas that are too speculative for traditional investors. There aren’t the Googles from which to hire key employees, and you couldn’t hire them anyway because of non-compete agreements. Not much can be done about missing out on the developments and successes of the past 20 years. However, eliminating non-compete agreements is likely the most obvious and effective corrective action that could be taken to set the stage for the next 20 years.

Nonetheless, all is not lost. Items 2 and 3 offer hope. The Boston area is still a home of prepared minds ready to pursue the next inevitable convergence of new technologies and market opportunities. The question is whether the Boston culture has learned enough from past failure to welcome the opportunity, or whether the Boston culture will continue its failed past myopic irrationality, and thereby, cede the development of the next major technology company to a more fertile environment. Many regions around the world are looking to provide such fertile environments for innovation…

– – – – –


While I was finishing this writeup, Scott Kirsner published an excellent article briefly comparing Facebook and Brightcove, their histories and IPOs:

“[…]Facebook and Brightcove, evolved very differently, and they’ll have very different IPOs. In 2004, Facebook left Boston for California; Brightcove remained in Cambridge. The growth of the firms says a great deal about the kind of companies the soil supports in Boston, versus what germinates out West…”

“The numerical differences are stark. Brightcove’s 2011 revenue was $63 million, but the company had a net loss of $17 million. Brightcove has 300 employees, and is expected to have a stock market value of about $300 million when it goes public… Allaire held on to 7 percent of the company after numerous funding rounds.

Zuckerberg owns 28 percent of Facebook, which made a $1 billion profit last year on $3.7 billion of revenue. The company has 3,000 employees and could be worth as much as $100 billion.”[31]

Sad, but True. Now, let’s fix it…

– – – – –

Notes and References

1. Facebook 2012-02-01 S-1 General form for registration of securities under the Securities Act of 1933.

2. Facebook IPO will create billionaires. Benny Evangelista. San Francisco Chronicle. 2012.02.05.
3. From Founders to Decorators, Facebook Riches. Nick Bilton; Evelyn M. Rusli. The New York Times. 2012.02.01.
4. What will the Facebook millionaires do? Lise Buyer. CNN. 2012.02.02.
5. Facebook’s Zuckerberg may face $2 billion tax bill. Stacy Cowley. CNN Money. 2012.02.07.

‘Facebook Effect’ Shows California’s Reliance on Capital Gains. Michael B. Marois; James Nash; Bloomberg News. San Francisco Chronicle. 2012.01.12.

6. “The San Jose/San Francisco CSA continues to expand its lead in the creation of S&P Technology Sector companies, and has 28% of the Technology Sector companies founded since 1991. These companies have 57% of the market capitalization and 45% of the revenue of all Technology Sector companies founded since 1991.

“Compared to the Boston CSA, since 1991, and normalizing for population size, the New York and Los Angeles CSAs, each created Technology Sector companies at a slightly greater rate; the Washington DC CSA, at more than twice the rate; the Seattle CSA, at more than 5 times the rate; and the San Jose/San Francisco CSA, at 10 times the rate.”

S&P 1500 Company Founding Dates. Empirical Reality. 2011.05.26.

7. Can Massachusetts produce the next Google? Scott Kirsner. The Boston Globe. 2011.12.18.

Building more ‘pillar’ companies in Boston: Bonus material. Scott Kirsner. The Boston Globe. 2011.12.19.

Facebook “Shock” Has Boston Firms Searching for Next Zuckerberg. Laura Keeley. Bloomberg. 2011.07.07.

8. Why Facebook went west. Turned down by a local venture capitalist, two Harvard students look to Silicon Valley for funding instead. The result: Boston misses out on an online phenomenon worth up to $6 billion. Scott Kirsner. 2007.09.09.
9. Lessons of the Last Bubble. Tim Laseter, David Kirsch, and Brent Goldfarb. Strategy+Business. Issue 46, Spring 2007. 2007.02.28

Goldfarb, Brent D., Kirsch, David and Miller, David A. Was There Too Little Entry During the Dot Com Era? Robert H. Smith School Research Paper No. RHS 06-029. 2006.04.24. Available at SSRN: or doi:10.2139/ssrn.899100

10. Conventional wisdom. Wikipedia.

Herd behavior. Wikipedia.

11. The quote is paraphrased in various ways, and attributed to various people. The earliest version in printed form appears to be from a 1981 book on a 12 step program from Narcotics Anonymous World Services, Inc. The direct quote from the book is: “Insanity is repeating the same mistakes and expecting different results.” Stated in this way, it has a basis in pathological human behavior. However, sentiment sounds more familiar and older than the 1981 date suggests. The quote also seems to echo, though in counterpoint, the earliest concepts in scientific method, reproducibility of experimental results, and the philosophy of empiricism.
12. The word “serendipity” was first used by Horace Walpole in a letter written in 1754 to Horace Mann. Walpole coins the word from a fairy tale called “The Travels and Adventures of Three Princes of Serendip”. Serendip is Persian for what is now Sri Lanka. See the following reference for a summary of the story.

The Three Prines of Serendip. Wikipedia.

13. Wallflower at the Web Party. Gary Rivlin. The New York Times. 2006.10.15.

The Friendster Tell-All Story. Michael Arrington. TechCrunch. 2006.10.15.

14. MySpace, History. Wikipedia.

The Rise and Inglorious Fall of Myspace. Felix Gillette. BusinessWeek. 2011.06.22.

15. Danah Boyd and Nicole Ellison. Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13 (1), article 11. 2007.10.00.
16. The paraphrased quote is from Louis Pasteur (1822-1895). He made the statement during his inaugural lecture as Dean of the Faculty of Science at the University of Lille, France (7 Dec 1854).

The original french is: “Dans les champs de l’observation le hasard ne favorise que les esprits préparés”, which is directly translated as: “In the fields of observation, chance favors only the prepared mind”.

Prior to coming to Lille, Pasteur worked in chemistry and crystallography, which he planned to continue. Reportedly, by chance in 1855, Pasteur was asked by a local beet alcohol producer to look at why they were having inconsistent results producing alcohol. Pasteur experimented with converting sugar to alcohol, and in 1857, published a paper that first presented his hypothesis of the role of yeast in fermentation. This then led to Pasteur’s life work on fermentation, brewing, microorganisms, sterilization and pasteurization, etc.

What makes the quote so impactful is that Pasteur stated that chance favors the prepared mind before he was by chance so favored.

17. J.C.R. Licklider. The Computer as a Communication Device. Science and Technology. 1968.04.00.

Though not a direct description of Facebook, Licklider describes an environment that in some ways goes beyond the current concept of social network: “An OLIVER is, or will be when there is one, an ‘on-line interactive vicarious expediter and responder,’ a complex of computer programs and data that resides within the network and acts on behalf of its principal, taking care of many minor matters that do not require his personal attention and buffering him from the demanding world. … It will know your value structure, who is prestigious in your eyes, for whom you will do what with what priority, and who can have access to which of your personal files.

18. Zuckerberg Remains the Undisputed Boss at Facebook. Somini Sengupta. The New York Times. 2012.02.03.

Power play: How Zuckerberg wrested control of Facebook from his shareholders. Jolie O’Dell. VentureBeat. 2012.02.01.

19. Steve Jobs’s Law: Why Founders Make the Best Leaders. James Kwak. The Atlantic. 2011.09.01.
20. With a Little Help From His Friends. David Kirkpatrick. Vanity Fair. 2010.10.01

Business, Casual. Kevin J. Feeney. The Harvard Crimson. 2005.02.24.

21. The Power of Angels. Empirical Reality. 2010.02.27.
22. Early Apple Business Documents. Computer History Museum.

The Apple World According to Markkula. John Markoff. The New York Times. 1997.09.01.

You’ve got to find what you love. Steve Jobs. Stanford University Commencement Address. 2005.06.12.

Video of Steve Jobs’ Commencement Address.

23. If the Check Says ‘Google Inc.,’ We’re ‘Google Inc.’ Wired. 1998.09.07.

Uniquely Google. The Newsletter of Stanford’s Office of Technology Licensing (OTL). 2000.03.01.

24. Peter Thiel: An Angel on a Hot Streak. Business Week. 2010.02.25.
25. The Art of Raising Angel Capital. Guy Kawasaki. 2006.03.02.
26. Outing Boston’s top angel investors. Scott Kirsner. The Boston Globe. 2010.04.14.

Boston’s Best Angel Investors. Jon Pierce Blog.

27. The Absence of Non-Competes Fosters Innovation and Growth. Empirical Reality. 2011.03.16.
28. Joseph A. Schumpeter. Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process. McGraw-Hill. New York. 1939.
29. A Woman’s Place – Can Sheryl Sandberg upend Silicon Valley’s male-dominated culture? Ken Auletta. The New Yorker. 2011.07.11.

Why Facebook Needs Sheryl Sandberg. Brad Stone. Business Week. 2011.05.11.

30. David Mackenzie Ogilvy, 1911-1999.

The House That Ogilvy Built. Kenneth Roman. strategy + business. 2009.02.24.

31. What Brightcove, Facebook tell us about Mass. start-up climate. Scott Kirsner. The Boston Globe. 2012.02.12.

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